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Eyes Wide Shut: Hidden Problems and Future 
Consequences of the Fact-Based Validity Standard 
Joëlle Anne Moreno∗ 
Over the past decade Daubert1 has transformed judicial decisions 
involving questions of science and law.  Daubert governs the federal 
courts and the 30 states that adopted Daubert in whole or in part.2  
                                                          
 ∗ Associate Professor, New England School of Law.  I would like to thank 
Professors D. Michael Risinger and Mark P. Denbeaux for inviting me to this 
excellent conference and Professors Ronald J. Allen and Paul C. Giannelli for their 
provocative and insightful comments. 
 1 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 2 See Alabama—S. Energy Homes, Inc. v. Washington, 774 So. 2d 505, 516-17 
(Ala. 2000) (acknowledging that the legislature has used Daubert with respect to DNA 
evidence, but not explicitly switching standard from Frye to Daubert for other 
evidence); Alaska—State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 388-99 (Alaska 1999) (adopting the 
Daubert standard); Arizona—Logerquist v. McVey, No. CV-98-0587-PR, 2000 WL 
419980 (Ariz. Apr. 19, 2000) (en banc) (retaining the Frye standard); Arkansas—
Moore v. State, 915 S.W.2d 284, 293-94 (Ark. 1996) (recognizing the Daubert standard 
but not expressly adopting it); California—People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 323-24 
(Cal. 1994) (refusing to adopt Daubert and noting that California has long held to the 
Frye standard and would continue to do so); Colorado—Brooks v. People, 975 P.2d 
1105, 1113 (Colo. 1999) (en banc) (noting that Colorado "has neither explicitly 
endorsed nor rejected the Daubert analysis"); Connecticut—State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 
739, 751 (Conn. 1997) (adopting the Daubert standard); Delaware—Bell Sports, Inc. 
v. Yarusso, 759 A.2d 582 (Del. 2000) (expressly adopting Daubert); Florida—Brim v. 
State, 695 So. 2d 268, 271-72 (Fla. 1997) (rejecting Daubert); Georgia—Jordan v. Ga. 
Power Co., 466 S.E.2d 601, 604-05 (Ga. 1995) (applying state law and not adopting 
Daubert); Hawaii—State v. Fukusaku, 946 P.2d 32, 42 (Haw. 1997) (refusing to follow 
Daubert); Idaho—State v. Trevino, 980 P.2d 552, 557-58 (Idaho 1999) (adopting the 
Daubert standard); Indiana—Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Manuilov, 742 N.E.2d 453, 462 
(Ind. 2001) (retaining the Frye standard); Iowa—Leaf v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co., 590 N.W.2d 525, 530-33 (Iowa 1999) (adopting a limited application of Daubert); 
Kansas—State v. Canaan, 964 P.2d 681, 691-92, 694 (Kan. 1998) (retaining the Frye 
standard); Kentucky—Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 908 S.W.2d 100 (Ky. 1995) 
(Daubert expressly adopted); Louisiana—State v. Ledet, 792 So. 2d 160 (La. 2001) 
(adopting the Daubert standard); Maine—State v. McDonald, 718 A.2d 195 (Me. 
1998) (adopting Daubert); Maryland—Hutton v. State, 663 A.2d 1289, 1295-96 n.10 
(Md. 1995) (determining that Maryland will still follow the Frye standard despite the 
fact that Maryland's Rules of Evidence are patterned after the Federal Rules of 
Evidence and were passed into legislation after the Daubert decision); 
Massachusetts—Commonwealth v. Senior, 744 N.E.2d 614 (Mass. 2001) (applying 
various Daubert factors); Michigan—Although the Michigan Supreme Court has not 
addressed the issue, the consensus among the lower courts favors Frye.  See, e.g. 
People v. Coy, No. 238112, 2003 Mich. App. LEXIS 1880, at *12 n.3 (Mich. Ct. App. 
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Even in states that retain a Frye-type “general acceptance” standard,3 
most state judges report that Daubert exerts a powerful influence on 
their admissibility decisions.4  Since Daubert, judges must decide for 
                                                                                                                                      
Aug. 7, 2003) (stating that until the Michigan Supreme Court holds otherwise, the 
lower courts are bound to apply Frye).  The Michigan legislature, however, has 
codified Daubert for expert scientific opinion in actions for “death of a person or for 
injury to a person or property . . . .”  See MICH. STAT. ANN. 600.2955 (Michie 2003); 
Minnesota—State v. Klawitter, 518 N.W.2d 577, 585 & n.3 (Minn. 1994) (noting that 
the Frye standard has been utilized before and after Daubert although expressing that 
"we do not address the effect of the Daubert decision on the use or application of the 
Frye rule in Minnesota"); Mississippi—Gleeton v. State, 716 So. 2d 1083, 1087 (Miss. 
1998) (retaining the Frye standard); Missouri—Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 
863 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 1993) (continuing to apply Frye); Montana—State v. Moore, 885 
P.2d 457 (Mont. 1994) (adopting the Daubert standard); Nebraska—Sheridan v. 
Catering Mgmt., Inc., 566 N.W.2d 110, 113 (Neb. 1997) (retaining the Frye standard); 
Nevada—Krause Inc. v. Little, 34 P.3d 556, 569 (Nev. 2001) (reiterating an earlier 
rejection of Daubert); New Hampshire—State v. Cort, 766 A.2d 260 (N.H. 2000) 
(applying various Daubert factors); New Jersey—State v. Harvey, 699 A.2d 596, 621 
(N.J. 1997) (applying various Daubert factors); New Mexico—State v. Anderson, 881 
P.2d 29 (N.M. 1994) (adopting the Daubert standard); New York—People v. Wernick, 
674 N.E.2d 322, 324 (N.Y. 1996) (retaining the Frye standard); North Carolina—State 
v. Goode, 461 S.E.2d 631, 639, 641 (N.C. 1995) (adopting the Daubert standard); 
North Dakota—City of Fargo v. McLaughlin, 512 N.W.2d 700, 705 n.2 (N.D. 1994) 
(retaining the Frye standard); Ohio—Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 687 N.E.2d 735 
(Ohio 1998) (adopting Daubert factors); Oklahoma—Christian v. Gray, 65 P.3d 591 
(Okla. 2003) (expressly adopting Daubert/Kumho for civil matters and noting that the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has already done the same for criminal 
matters); Pennsylvania—Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 723 A.2d 162, 170 & n.10 (Pa. 
1999) (retaining the Frye standard); Rhode Island—State v. Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d 
879, 884 n.2 (R.I. 1996) (adopting the Daubert standard); South Carolina - State v. 
Council, 515 S.E.2d 508, 518 (S.C. 1998) (using factors similar to, but not specifically 
adopting, the Daubert factors); South Dakota—State v. Hofer, 512 N.W.2d 482 (S.D. 
1994) (adopting the Daubert standard); Tennessee—McDaniel v. CSX Transp., Inc., 
955 S.W.2d 257 (Tenn. 1997) (adopting the Daubert standard); Texas—E.I. du Pont 
Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995) (adopting the Daubert 
standard); Utah—State v. Butterfield, 27 P.3d 1133 (Utah 2001) (stating that the test 
for admissibility requires threshold showing of “inherent reliability”); Vermont—
State v. Brooks, 643 A.2d 226 (Vt. 1993) (adopting the Daubert decision); Virginia –
Spencer v. Commonwealth, 393 S.E.2d 609, 621 (Va. 1990) (expressly declining to 
follow Frye, but not adopting Daubert); Washington—State v. Copeland, 922 P.2d 
1304, 1310 (Wash. 1996) (retaining the Frye standard); West Virginia—Wilt v. 
Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196 (W. Va. 1993) (adopting the Daubert decision); Wisconsin—
State v. Peters, 534 N.W.2d 867 (Wis. 1995) (basing admissibility on three-part 
relevance test); Wyoming—Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467 (Wyo. 1999) (adopting 
the Daubert standard).  The District of Columbia has not yet adopted Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702, and there has been no majority opinion that has addressed Daubert. Cf. 
Taylor v. United States, 661 A.2d 636, 651-52 (D.C. 1995) (Newman, S.J., dissenting) 
(urging the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert). 
 3 Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
 4 See Sophia I. Gatowski et al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on 
Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 433, 443 
(2001) (describing how 94% of state court judges surveyed find Daubert has either 
“some value” or “a great deal of value” for their decision-making process on 
questions involving scientific evidence regardless of whether Daubert or Frye governs 
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themselves whether proffered evidence is scientifically reliable; they 
may no longer defer to the scientific community.5  Daubert, the 
Supreme Court’s response to growing concerns that jurors were using 
“junk science” to decide legal cases,6 contains the implicit assumption 
that forcing judges into uncharted terrain is better than exposing 
jurors to evidence they could never hope to understand.7 
In 1998, the Kumho8 Court expanded the requirement of 
autonomous judicial validity screening beyond scientific evidence to 
include technology-based evidence and a potentially infinite 
undefined class of evidence that relates to “specialized knowledge.”9  
Although Justice Breyer did not explicitly ground his analysis of the 
plaintiff’s tire engineering evidence in the four Daubert scientific 
reliability criteria, i.e., (1) testability/falsifiability; (2) error rates; (3) 
peer review and publication; and (4) general acceptance,10 he 
emphasized that similar factors should govern the evaluation of 
technical or specialized evidence.11  According to the Kumho Court, 
                                                                                                                                      
admissibility in their jurisdiction). 
 5 Although the Daubert Court used the word “reliable” to refer to the quality of 
the scientific evidence, I have argued elsewhere that this reflects a misunderstanding 
of this scientific term of art and that “validity” is a more accurate term.  See Joëlle 
Anne Moreno, Beyond the Polemic Against Junk Science: Navigating the Oceans that Divide 
Science and Law With Justice Breyer at the Helm, 81 B.U. L. REV. 1033, 1065-70 (2001) 
(describing how “reliability” refers only to the reproducibility of data, even if the data 
are wrong, while “validity” connotes a connection between the theory or conclusions 
and the empirical world). 
 6 See generally PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE 
COURTROOM (1991).  There is an ongoing concern, a decade after Daubert, that 
“jurors may also be influenced by scientific evidence that lacks validity . . . .  If jurors 
are unable to differentiate high-quality research from “junk” science, then it is likely 
that their decisions will be influenced by both methodologically sound and 
methodologically inferior research, which is clearly an undesirable outcome.”  See 
Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Reasoning About Scientific Evidence Effects of Juror Gender and 
Evidence Quality on Juror Decisions in a Hostile Work Environment Case, 94 J. APPLIED 
PSYCHOL. 362 (1999). 
 7 “While meticulous Daubert inquiries may bring judges under criticism for 
donning white coats and making determinations that are outside their field of 
expertise, the Supreme Court has obviously deemed this less objectionable than 
dumping a barrage of questionable scientific evidence on a jury . . . .”  Joseph 
Sanders et al., Legal Perceptions of Science and Expert Knowledge, 8 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y 
& L. 139, 152 (2002). 
 8 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
 9 See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141 (holding that the Daubert gate-keeping role “applies 
not only to expert testimony based on ‘scientific’ knowledge, but also to testimony 
based on ‘technical’ and ‘other specialized knowledge’”).  The Daubert decision had 
been explicitly limited to scientific evidence.  See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.8 (“Our 
discussion is limited to the scientific context because that is the nature of the 
expertise offered here.”). 
 10 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-97. 
 11 The Kumho Court makes a fairly bold assumption that criteria taken from (and 
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“where such testimony’s factual basis, data, principles, methods, or 
their application are called sufficiently into question, the trial judge 
must determine whether the testimony has ‘a reliable basis in the 
knowledge and experience of [the relevant] discipline.’”12  Kumho 
also added what may become a fifth criterion: “that an expert, 
whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal 
experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual 
rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant 
field.”13  Although Daubert and the post-Daubert cases clearly state that 
these factors are neither fixed nor definitive,14 courts often operate 
the admissibility standard by applying the factors in turn.15 
                                                                                                                                      
designed for) the assessment of “hard” empirical science can be useful for evaluating 
all manner of specialized knowledge.  This is where Daubert is least likely to fit its own 
task at hand and where the doctrine has not yet been developed.  In his contribution 
to this Symposium, Professor Allen presages the conflict.  “To ‘apply’ the standards 
of Daubert to this vast and forbidding landscape, as Kumho Tire directs, seems to result 
in a significant mismatch between tool and task. . . . [because] Daubert was fashioned 
with normal science in mind and invokes standard criteria of scientific validation, 
such as controlled studies and the like.”  Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the Supreme 
Court: What is the Problem?, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 2 (2003). 
 12 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 149 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592). 
 13 Id. at 152. 
 14 In their contribution to this Symposium, Professors Mark P. Denbeaux and D. 
Michael Risinger express concern that courts frequently overlook the fact that the 
Daubert factors were intended to be flexible, despite the fact that the Kumho Court 
“further emphasizes (by way of reiterating a part of Daubert often unfortunately 
ignored) that the four factors were not each necessary conditions for a proper 
reliability warrant, nor were other factors foreclosed.”  Mark P. Denbeaux & D. 
Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire and Expert Reliability: How the Question You Ask Gives the 
Answer You Get, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 15, 32 (2003).  Perhaps this concern will 
become less pressing in the wake of Judge Pollak’s recent and widely-read decision in 
United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002).  Judge Pollak devoted 
considerable time and attention to this very question, repeatedly mentioning the 
“flexible” nature of the Daubert inquiry, id. at 562, and explicitly noting that Kumho 
clarified that “Daubert’s list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively 
applies to all experts in every case.”  Id. at 562.  Judge Pollak specifically links this 
careful reading of Kumho to his decision to reconsider his earlier ruling, that 
prosecution experts would not be permitted to present expert testimony that certain 
fingerprints matched because the methodology of fingerprint analysis failed to satisfy 
three of the four Daubert factors.  See United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 
(E.D. Pa. 2002).  Underlying the entire decision reexamining the fingerprint 
evidence is Judge Pollak’s thorough consideration of the question of whether the 
four Daubert factors are a “reasonable measure of the reliability of expert testimony.”  
188 F. Supp. 2d at 563-75. 
 15 See, e.g., Lauzon v. Senco Prods., Inc., 270 F.3d 681, 686-96 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(providing a detailed analysis of each of the four Daubert factors in turn); see also 
Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 14, at 32 n.70 (“The four factors have too often 
been leaden deadweights woodenly applied, inert impediments to the development 
of a sophisticated approach by the courts to belief warrants for scientific evidence.”).  
In response, Professors Denbaux and Risinger have developed an alternative inquiry 
based on the following four components: “(1) [f]raming the case-specific target 
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I. THE EMERGENCE OF A FACT-BASED VALIDITY STANDARD 
Kumho did more than just expand the range of evidence subject 
to more intensive and structured pretrial judicial scrutiny.  I have 
previously posited that Kumho contained a subtle correction of 
Daubert16 perhaps intended to address five years of perceived judicial 
reluctance to embrace the enhanced gate keeping role.17  Whatever 
the Court’s motivation,18 Kumho refocused the admissibility decision 
so that the fit/relevance prong of the two-part Daubert test became 
more prominent.  Justice Breyer emphasized that judges must assess 
evidentiary reliability, not in some broad or abstract manner, but as 
the evidence has been applied by this expert to the narrow “task at 
hand.”19 
                                                                                                                                      
issue; (2) [f]raming the case-specific claim of expertise; (3) [d]etermining what 
available information bears on a rational belief warrant in regard to the reliability of 
the claimed expertise; [and] (4) [d]etermining the proper case-specific legal 
standard of certainty for such a belief warrant.”  Id. at 33. 
 16 The problem with Daubert might have been caused by the fact that the Court 
placed the general reliability/validity step of the Daubert inquiry first.  This structure 
could appear to require that judges first determine whether proposed expert 
testimony is generally considered “scientific knowledge,” before exploring its 
relevance.  Judges who read Daubert this way would balk at the requirement assumed 
that they assess a potentially infinite amount of scientific information, most of which 
would not be relevant to the facts at issue.  See Moreno, supra note 5, at 1052-55. 
 17 This concern is addressed in the Advisory Committee Notes to the 2000 
amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which state “[a] review of the case law 
after Daubert shows that the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than 
the rule.”  FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note; see also Erica Beecher-Monas, 
Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in Scientific Evidence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 
58 (1998) (“All too often, however, courts continue to evade the science issues.  In 
far too many jurisdictions, judges are turning a blind eye to the science involved in 
the evidence before them.”); David L. Faigman, et al.., How Good is Good Enough?: 
Expert Evidence Under Daubert and Kumho, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 645, 665 (2000) 
(“In the forensic context, courts have long admitted a surfeit of expertise with little 
or no evaluation of the foundation upon which the opinion rests.”); Jay P. Kesan, 
Who Knows Where the Time Goes?: A Critical Examination of the Post-Daubert Landscape, 
52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 225, 239-40 (1997) (reviewing numerous post-Daubert cases and 
concluding that “the quantum of scientific information that must undergird an 
expert’s methodology to render it scientifically valid and admissible under Daubert is 
quite minimal”).  However, a recent empirical study of a sample of federal district 
court opinions published between 1980 and 1999 concluded that after Daubert, “ 
judges are more actively screening expert evidence[;] whether they are doing so in 
ways that produce better outcomes has not been determined.”  Lloyd Dixon & Brian 
Gill, Changes in the Standards for Admitting Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Cases Since the 
Daubert Decision, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & LAW 251, 251 (2002). 
 18 Professor Allen suggests another possible motivation that “no matter how well 
credentialed and conversant in an established field, an expert may still testify to 
falsehoods.”  See Allen, supra note 11, at 5. 
 19 This is also emphasized in the Kumho Court’s conclusion that “the question 
before the trial court was specific, not general.  The trial court had to decide whether 
this particular expert had sufficient specialized knowledge to assist jurors ‘in deciding 
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[T]he specific issue before the [district] court was not the 
reasonableness in general of a tire expert’s use of a visual and 
tactile inspection, [but was instead] the reasonableness of using 
such an approach . . . to draw a conclusion regarding the 
particular matter to which the expert testimony was directly 
relevant.20 
Various federal courts have read Kumho to require evaluation of the 
application of the science, technology, or specialized knowledge to the 
specific facts at issue21 and this shift in emphasis was also reflected in 
the December 2000 amendments to Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.22 
If scientific, technological, and specialized evidence is likely to 
be admitted or excluded based upon the court’s evaluation of how 
                                                                                                                                      
the particular issues in the case.’”  Kumho, 526 U.S. at 156 (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted).  According to Professor Risinger who has also advanced the idea of a new 
focus on the “task at hand,” 
what is clearly not consistent with Kumho Tire is any attempt to 
approach the issue of reliability globally.  That is, reliability cannot be 
judges globally, “as drafted,” but only specifically, “as applied.”  The 
emphasis on the judgment of reliability as it applies to the individual 
case, to the “task at hand,” runs through the opinion like a river. 
D. Michael Risinger, Defining the “Task at Hand:” Non-Science Forensic Science After 
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV 767, 773 (2000).  
 20 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 153. 
 21 See, e.g., Seatrax, Inc. v. Sonbeck Int’l., Inc., 200 F.3d 358, 372 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(“Whether Daubert’s suggested indicia of reliability apply to any given testimony 
depends on the nature of the issue at hand, the witness’s particular expertise, and 
the subject of the testimony.  It is a fact-specific inquiry.”) (internal citation omitted); 
United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 315 (7th Cir. 2000) (noting that the Kumho 
Court engaged in a thorough reexamination of the technology relevant to the facts 
that had been presented to the district court); United States v. Brumley, 217 F.3d 
905, 911 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that “[t]he Supreme Court in Kumho Tire explained 
that the Daubert ‘gatekeeper’ factors had to be adjusted to fit the facts of the particular 
case at issue, with the goal of testing the reliability of the expert opinion”) (emphasis 
added); United States v. Horn, 185 F. Supp. 2d 530, 554 (D. Md. 2002) (“[J]udges do 
not determine the reliability of scientific or technical issues in the abstract but rather 
in the context of deciding a particular dispute.”). 
 22 Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was amended to include the following (shown in 
italics): 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, 
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, 
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness 
has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. 
FED. R. EVID. 702.  The amended Rule 702 has also been interpreted to require a 
relevance-based focus.  See, e.g., Cloud v. Pfizer Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1130 (D. 
Ariz. 2001) (“[F]ederal judges must exclude proffered scientific evidence under Rule 
702 unless they are convinced that it speaks clearly and directly to an issue in dispute 
in the case . . . .”). 
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well an expert can apply her knowledge and methods to a discrete set 
of facts, the advantages and disadvantages of this more case-specific 
approach must be explored. 
A. Local Advantages, Global Problems 
I have previously described some of the advantages of a more 
fact-specific admissibility inquiry.23  At the local or individual case 
level, limiting the scope of the pretrial evaluation to those principles 
and methods actually applied by this expert to a given set of facts has 
at least two advantages.  By limiting the scope of the analysis, this 
inquiry conforms more realistically to most judges’ limited 
understanding of complex scientific, technical or other highly 
specialized information.  It also serves the omnipresent judicial 
concerns of timeliness and efficiency.  Upon further reflection, and 
in light of more recent empirical data, the global or systemic 
disadvantages of a fact-intensive validity assessment have become 
more apparent. 
Recent empirical data demonstrate that an overwhelming 
number of judges do not comprehend the basic scientific principles 
that underlie the Daubert decision.  This study concludes that two of 
the four Daubert factors, testability/falsifiability and error rates, are 
uniformly misunderstood and misapplied.24  Although this same study 
finds that most judges accurately comprehend and apply the only 
other Daubert criterion added to the Frye standard, i.e., peer review 
and publication, facility with this remaining factor provides cold 
comfort in light of even more recent biomedical data. 
Last year the JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 
(“JAMA”), dedicated an entire issue to reporting on extensive recent 
empirical data that cast grave doubts on the general assumption, 
adopted wholeheartedly by the Daubert Court, that peer review 
actually enhances the validity of scientific publications.25  The 
problem with courts using peer review and publication to assess the 
validity of scientific evidence lies not with judges (who can 
understand and operate this criterion), but with the scientists 
themselves.  The JAMA data expose hidden impediments that may 
hinder gate keeping efforts by even the most scientifically 
sophisticated and conscientious members of the judiciary. 
In addition to these troubling new data, we must consider the 
global or systemic effects of a judicial and legislative movement 
                                                          
 23 See generally Moreno, supra note 5. 
 24 See Gatowski et al., supra note 4, at 439. 
 25 See generally 287 JAMA 2739-2898 (June 5, 2002) [hereinafter JAMA]. 
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towards a more fact-based qualitative assessment of scientific 
evidence.  Case-specific evaluation of science “as applied” runs afoul 
of bedrock scientific principles, conflicts with widely-accepted 
methods of gauging validity, and guarantees that we cannot develop 
consistent or useful precedent. 
The danger is that judges who lack scientific facility and perceive 
their role as limited to an assessment of the science applied by this 
expert in this case may be less rigorous in their evaluation.  This can 
be particularly problematic if judges mistakenly assume that an 
imprimatur of validity from within the discipline itself provides some 
sort of guarantee.  Under these circumstances, it is hard to have faith 
that over the past decade the Daubert admissibility standard has been 
accurately understood or consistently applied. 
II. HIDDEN DANGERS: JUDGES’ PROBLEMS UNDERSTANDING AND 
APPLYING THE DAUBERT CRITERIA OF TESTIFIABILITY/FALSIFIABILITY 
AND ERROR RATES 
A recent study of four hundred judges demonstrates that the vast 
majority of state court judges cannot comprehend or implement even 
the most basic scientific concepts.26  The Gatowski study was designed 
to “assess the level at which the judiciary understand the scientific 
meaning of the Daubert guidelines and how they might apply them 
when evaluating the admissibility of scientific evidence.”27  It provided 
information that had never previously been collected, analyzed, or 
published28 and researchers used a different methodology for data 
collection.  They questioned judges directly, rather than the 
previously favored method of relying on a retrospective analyses of 
published judicial opinions.29 
While providing important insight regarding the influence of 
Daubert, an empirical analysis of published case law is, by its very 
nature, restricted to an analysis of post hoc justifications of those 
writing a decision in a particular case and does not fully capture 
the judicial decision-making process.  Although an empirical 
analysis of case law provides important data about judges’ 
normative, case specific reasoning, research has demonstrated 
that there may be significant differences between published and 
unpublished cases, and that these differences may be dependent 
                                                          
 26 See Gatowski et al., supra note 4, at 439.  This national survey involved judges 
throughout the country in states that have adopted Daubert, states that have adopted 
a modified version of Daubert, and states that continue to apply Frye.  See id. 
 27 Id. at 438. 
 28 See id. at 433-35. 
 29 See id. 
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upon the case characteristics analyzed and the legal questions 
involved.30 
The Gatowski study concluded that Daubert is neither accurately 
nor consistently applied.31  The overwhelming majority of judges have 
no real understanding of two of the four Daubert criteria.32  
Specifically, while 88% of the judges reported that “falsifiability”33 is a 
useful guideline for assessing scientific evidence, 96% of these same 
judges lacked even a basic understanding of this core scientific 
concept.34  Similarly, 91% of the judges reported that they found 
“error rates”35 helpful, although when questioned, they had no real 
understanding of this basic scientific precept.36 
These findings lead the researchers to conclude that “judges 
have difficulty operationalizing the Daubert criteria and applying 
                                                          
 30 Id. 
 31 See Gatowski et al., supra note 4, at 443.  Other commentators have noted that 
the Gatowski study substantiated existing “uncertainty about whether judges, despite 
their best intentions, have the time or training to carry out their gatekeeper 
responsibilities effectively.”  Dixon & Gill, supra note 17, at 245. 
 32 See Gatowski et al., supra note 4, at 444-46. 
 33 Nine years ago, the Daubert Court concluded that falsifiability was “a key 
question to be answered in determining whether a theory or technique is scientific 
knowledge that will assist the trier of fact,” and defined falsifiability as “whether it 
[the theory] can be (and has been) tested.”  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.  In a law review 
article by Professor Mark Green, quoted by the Supreme Court in Daubert, 
falsifiability is further defined as the theory that “knowledge is gained by attempting 
to disprove or falsify a hypothesis based on empirical investigation.  Scientific 
methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they 
can be falsified.  Indeed, this methodology is what distinguished science from other 
fields of human inquiry.”  See id. at 586 n.4 (citing Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses 
and Sufficiency of Evidence in Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and 
Bendectin Litigation, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 643, 645 (1992)). 
 34 See Gatowski et al., supra note 4, at 444-45.  This means that judges could not 
articulate the assumptions underlying Daubert (1) that scientific hypotheses are not 
proved through testing; (2) that testing is aimed at refuting a hypothesis; (3) that 
hypotheses that are not refutable/falsifiable are by definition not scientific; and (4) 
that only hypotheses that are not falsified, but could be, provide the basis for reliable 
scientific theories. 
 35 The Daubert Court cautioned that “in the case of a particular scientific 
technique, the court ordinarily should consider the known or potential rate of error 
and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s 
operation.”  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 (internal citations omitted).  When error rates 
are used to assess the validity of a scientific methodology, they can include false 
negative errors (when an experimenter misses a real effect), false positive errors 
(when an experimenter perceives an effect that did not occur), and sampling errors 
(when an experimenter extrapolates from a small sample to a large population).  See 
KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND 
THE FEDERAL COURTS 75-76 (1999) (defining false positive and false negative errors 
and describing how they can result in sampling error). 
 36 See Gatowski et al., supra note 4, at 445. 
  
98 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 34:089 
them, especially with respect to falsifiability and error rate.”37  The 
researchers also noted that despite specific efforts by interviewers 
aimed at allowing judges to express their level of comprehension 
using their own words, “it seems likely that the ambiguity of the 
[judges’] responses may reflect a genuine lack of understanding of 
these scientific concepts.”38  It is not surprising that the study found 
that judges scored much higher in their basic comprehension of the 
last two Daubert criteria: peer review and publication (71%) and the 
Frye criterion of general acceptance (82%).39  However, even more 
recent scientific data demonstrate that judicial comfort and 
familiarity with some of the Daubert factors may do little to ensure that 
only valid science enters the courts. 
III. FLAWED ASSUMPTIONS: PEER REVIEW MAY NOT ENHANCE THE 
VALIDITY OF SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATIONS 
Of the two remaining Daubert criteria, only the requirement that 
judges assess “peer review and publication” adds any teeth to the old 
Frye inquiry.  However, this Daubert factor has been dormant for a 
decade, virtually ignored by courts and commentators. 
The Daubert Court clearly intended that judges use their own 
evaluation of peer review and publication as a tool for exploring 
whether substantive flaws in an expert’s methodology have been or 
could have been exposed.40  This reading of Daubert makes sense for 
three reasons.  First, it is logically consistent with the Court’s 
overarching concern that judges play a more active and autonomous 
role in the evaluation of scientific validity.  Second, it fits with the 
Court’s desire to require judges to assess falsifiability, because judges 
would be forced to examine peer review and publication in some 
detail as part of an effort to determine whether a theory is capable of 
being tested.  Third, it is consistent with the Court’s concern about 
error rates because it shares the same goal of exposing 
methodological flaws.  If Daubert were read this way, judges would 
need to look critically at the standards and procedures of any peer 
review proffered by the expert and evaluate the substance of all 
published work.  It may be no surprise that this is not what has 
happened.  Instead peer review and publication has become a 
                                                          
 37 Id. at 452. 
 38 Id. 
 39 See id. at 447-48. 
 40 According to the Daubert Court, judges must evaluate peer review and 
publication because “submission to the scrutiny of the scientific community is a 
component of good science because it increases the likelihood that substantive flaws 
in the methodology will be detected.” 
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virtually meaningless Frye-type surrogate for real review with the mere 
fact of peer review, publication, or peer reviewed publication serving 
as a validity enhancer.41 
This is problematic at both a local and global level.  If the fact 
that a theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and has 
been published tells us anything useful about its validity, it tells us 
only something vague and general.  The mere fact of peer review 
and/or publication inevitably tells us nothing about (1) the nature or 
quality of the peer review process; (2) the effect of peer review on the 
validity of the methods or conclusions contained in the published 
work; or (3) whether the validity of the published methods or 
conclusions is impacted by the manner in which this expert proposes 
to use the theory or technique to make inferences or draw 
conclusions in this case. 
In a series of very recent studies published in the June 5, 2002 
issue of JAMA, scientists themselves question whether peer review has 
any positive effect on the quality of medical articles that appear in 
even the most prestigious scientific publications.42  Here are just a few 
examples of the conclusions drawn from the many empirical studies 
assessing the actual value of peer review. 
• That an examination of articles before and after they had 
been subjected to peer review reveals that “true effects 
[of peer review] have not been determined . . . [and] the 
term peer review is used to describe a number of 
different processes . . . [so] it may not always be possible 
to make a clear distinction between peer review and 
technical editing.”43 
• That a study of methodological problems in published 
reports of randomized controlled trials (“RCTs”) reveals 
that “there is considerable evidence that many published 
reports of RCTs are poor or even wrong, despite their 
                                                          
 41 A recent Lexis search revealed that 92 post-Kumho federal appellate court cases 
mentioned the phrase “peer review and publication.”  Eighty-six of these cases were 
mere recitations of the Daubert factors.  A recent study assessing the effect of Daubert 
in criminal cases found that appellate court opinions which devoted an average of 
1,162 words to a discussion of expert evidence, devoted only an average of 15 words 
to the peer review and publication criterion.  Ironically, cases decided before Daubert 
devoted an average of 21 words to peer review and publication while cases decided 
after Daubert devoted only an average of five words, just one more than repeating the 
criterion requires.  Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility 
of Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 339, 
350 (2002). 
 42 See JAMA, supra note 26. 
 43 Tom Jefferson et al., Measuring the Quality of Editorial Peer Review, in JAMA, supra 
note 26, at 2787. 
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clear importance.”44 
• That a cross-sectional study of 243 original research 
articles published in a variety of scientific journals reveals 
that “many published reports are of poor-to-average 
methodological quality.”45 
• That “[a]lthough there is considerable evidence that 
methodological errors are common in articles in medical 
journals, much published research does not have 
substantive contribution from a statistician.”46 
• That a study of the methodological quality of 60 
published reports of RCTs reveals that “[t]he validity of . 
. . results is threatened by the subversion of 
randomization, resulting in biased allocation to 
comparison groups, the unequal provision of care apart 
from the intervention under evaluation, the biased 
assessment of outcomes, and the inadequate handling of 
dropouts and losses to follow-up.”47 
In a summary editorial, Dr. Drummond Rennie explained that these 
data reflect a sixteen-year long coordinated international effort to 
research the effects of peer review.48  According to Dr. Rennie, 
despite a concerted effort to study and improve the process, “we find 
ourselves in the peculiar position of believing still more in the virtues 
of peer review, a system we know to be time-consuming, complex, 
expensive, and prone to abuse, while we acknowledge that the 
scientific evidence for its value is meager.”49 
The implications of this new empirical evidence are profound.  
As the world grows more scientifically complex, many judges seem to 
lack even basic familiarity with the scientific process and scientists 
themselves have dubious faith in their own quality-control 
mechanisms.  Daubert, Kumho, and the modifications to Rule 702 
reflect a coordinated judicial and legislative effort to construct an 
analytic tool enabling lay judges (and then in turn lay jurors) to 
discriminate between good and bad science.  This task, which is 
                                                          
 44 Douglas G. Altman, Poor-Quality Medical Research: What Can Journals Do?, in 
JAMA, supra note 26, at 2765. 
 45 Kirby P. Lee et al., Association of Journal Quality Indicators With Methodological 
Quality of Clinical Research Articles, in JAMA supra note 26, at 2805. 
 46 Douglas G. Altman et al., How Statistical Expertise is Used in Medical Research, in 
JAMA supra note 26, at 2817. 
 47 Karin Huwiler-Müntener et al., Quality of Reporting of Randomized Trials as a 
Measure of Methodologic Quality, in JAMA supra note 26, at 2801. 
 48 See Drummond Rennie, Editorial, Fourth International Congress on Peer Review in 
Biomedical Publication, in JAMA, supra note 26, at 2759-60. 
 49 Id. (quotation omitted). 
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difficult enough, is exacerbated when judges are hampered by their 
lack of scientific sophistication and are forced to acknowledge that 
even published, peer-reviewed studies may contain serious 
undisclosed methodological flaws.50 
IV. HOW CAN WE USE THIS INFORMATION? 
The question then becomes what impact should these data have 
on how we frame the admissibility inquiry?  Although we should 
recognize that peer review and publication do not guarantee 
scientific validity, these quality control mechanisms are not entirely 
without value.  Presumably, scientific journals reject a great deal of 
bad science.  In general, they seek to publish experiments that are 
described in sufficient detail so that their results may be replicated.  
Consider the alternative.  In a sense the internet is the most pervasive 
example of unlimited access to information without centralized 
oversight or control.  A quick search of what appear to be medical 
websites provides “data” to support the following scientific claims: (1) 
vitamins make people energetic; (2) special diets cure cancer; (3) 
acupuncture can cure a variety of diseases; and (4) childhood 
immunizations cause autism.51  Although imperfect, prepublication 
peer review maintains minimum standards of honesty and accuracy.52  
Given the fact that courts cannot abandon or improve the peer 
review and publication process, the best that judges can do is be more 
self-conscious about how they understand and use this evidence as 
part of the validity calculus and recognize that, as a tool, it has 
unfulfilled potential. 
                                                          
 50 In another recent empirical study of the effect of Daubert on civil cases, 
researchers concluded that “since Daubert, judges have examined the reliability of 
expert evidence more closely and have found more evidence unreliable as a result.  
Our analysis, however, does not allow us to conclude whether this increased scrutiny 
resulted in better outcomes.”  Dixon & Gill, supra note 17, at 269.  “Judges may feel 
compelled to evaluate reliability and yet not be knowledgeable enough in the 
relevant field to make accurate determinations.”  Id at 301. 
 51 For an extensive, regularly updated, and well-organized list of misleading 
medical and scientific websites, see www.quackwatch.com. 
 52 It is scientifically inaccurate and legally unnecessary to describe scientific 
theories as valid or invalid.  Theories involving science are never wholly accurate or 
wholly inaccurate explanations of the empirical world.  Scientific validity is better 
understood as a matter of degree rather than in absolute terms.  This means that 
“‘[v]alidity’ in science is not a binary attribute, like pregnancy.”  FOSTER & HUBER, 
supra note 37, at 17 (discussing issues of scientific uncertainty and the limited ability 
of scientists to speak in terms of absolutes).  This fits with the legal burden in cases 
involving scientific evidence, which is that “the proponent of the testimony does not 
have the burden of proving that it is scientifically correct, but that by a 
preponderance of the evidence, it is reliable . . . .”  Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 
184 F.3d 1300, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999). 
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V. THE INHERENT FALLACY OF FACT-BASED VALIDITY 
Finally, at the global or systemic level, we should recognize that 
judicial decisions that turn on whether a particular scientific theory 
or methodology has been reliably applied to a given set of facts, are 
scientifically meaningless.  A legal decision that is grounded in fact-
specific validity (e.g., a conclusion based on the specific scientific 
data relied upon by this expert to reliably explain these facts) is the 
antithesis of science.  Science, in all of its disciplines, is cumulative 
and based on a continuing aggregation of new data.53  In fact, 
scientific thought is premised on the assumption that conclusions are 
valid only if they “can be generalized to settings and subjects outside 
those described in the study.”54 
Case-specific determinations of the validity of a particular 
application of a scientific theory or method also undermine our goals 
by ensuring that little reliable or predictive precedent will be created 
to assist judges who must decide the admissibility of complex or 
disputed theories and techniques.  We do not want to end up where 
each court is engaged in a historically isolated fact-based analysis that 
will not perform the precedential function of controlling the quality 
of the science and technology that enters our courtrooms. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The fact that judges need to evaluate scientific evidence does not 
make it easy.  This is especially true in areas of complex or developing 
knowledge where the experts themselves are most likely to disagree.  
The danger is that judges who lack scientific facility and perceive 
their role as limited to an assessment of the science applied by this 
expert in this case may be less rigorous in their evaluation.  As the 
new studies reveal, judges may also be inclined to favor evaluative 
criteria that are easier for them to comprehend, regardless of their 
inherent ability to ferret out problems that should detract from the 
validity of the expert’s opinions and conclusions.  Finally, we must 
acknowledge that case-specific evaluations of science “as applied”  
run afoul of bedrock scientific principles and widely-accepted 
                                                          
 53 See FOSTER & HUBER, supra note 37, at 17. 
 54 See id. at 146.  Professor Allen makes a related observation when he states, 
“expert testimony cannot advance accurate outcomes locally unless it rests on 
acceptable epistemological warrant globally.  A necessary but not sufficient condition 
of appropriate testimony ‘locally’ is reliable expertise ‘globally.’” Allen, supra note 11, 
at 6.  Similarly, Professor Allen notes “[w]ithout global reliability, one has gibberish.  
Thus, the logical relationships underlying the Supreme Court’s cases require that 
both the global and local issues be resolved favorably before an expert should be 
allowed to testify.”  Id. 
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methods of gauging validity.  As Justice Rehnquist foretold in his 
Daubert dissent, “I defer to no one in my confidence in federal judges; 
but I am at a loss to know what is meant when it is said that the 
scientific status of a theory depends on its ‘falsifiability,’ and I suspect 
some of them will be, too.”55  Apparently, Justice Rehnquist had 
reason for concern. 
 
                                                          
 55 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
